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Abstract. The Delay/Disruption Tolerant Networking concept enables new applications and 
services in challenged networks such as rural and disaster areas networks, animal and 
environmental monitoring plus others. However and due to the shared and unsecured nature of 
such challenged networks, a good cryptographic framework is needed.  Identity Based 
Cryptography compares favorably against traditional public key cryptography, by generating 
encryption keys on a fly, based on the recipient identity. In this paper, we will provide security 
solution for the Delay/Disruption Tolerant Networking in rural areas using this technique. In 
addition, we use pseudonyms to provide anonymity and hide the identity of the end user. 
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1      Introduction 
 
Networks based on TCP/IP protocol stack works normally when end-to-end 
connectivity is available and the round trip time is small. To explain the problem with 
TCP in certain applications we take the scenario of interplanetary communications. If 
a node on earth wants to transmit data to space (or another planet) then it must go 
through the process of three way handshake. In addition to that if there is no 
communication for few minutes between two nodes then the TCP will assume time 
out. If we consider the data transfer between the earth and nearest planet then it will 
take approximately 24 minutes to transmit data and TCP will definitely fail. 
 
A Delay/Disruption Tolerant Network (DTN) is an overlay on top of regional 
networks including the Internet. The DTN architecture consists of a network of 
independent networks each characterised by Internet-like connectivity within, but 
having occasional communication opportunities among them. Connectivity can be 
scheduled and sometimes random. These independent networks form the DTN 
regions and are connected through a system of DTN gateways. Each DTN region 
relies on its own protocol stack that best suits its communication means, infrastructure 
and technologies. At the DTN nodes, a new layer (bundle layer) is added on top of the 
traditional transport layers to provide end-to-end data transfers among the DTN 
regions. The DTN overlay architecture operates above the existing protocol stacks 
found in other network architectures [1], [2]. DTN [3] supports heterogeneous 
environment and is based on idea of store and forward method.  Bundle layer is an 
implementation of DTN which supports heterogeneity of networks and ties together 
different regional networks. In DTN, data is sent in the form of bundle through store 
and forward relay. Bundle protocol [4] is working as communication medium which 
defines rules for bundle. Figure-1 shows the layer stack of DTN where Internet is 
used to facilitate communication between two DTN regions. However DTN can be 
used for other network apart from Internet. DTN gateways are intelligent to handle 
different transport layers with the help of convergence layer which is the part of 
bundle layer, however, network and data link layers are transparent to bundle layers. 
 
 
 Figure 1 DTN Layer Stack 
 
DTN can be implemented in many applications [9] e.g. Lake pollution monitoring, 
Deep space mission, Disaster monitoring and Rural area network. Apart from these it 
can also replace IP networks in applications like Web cache, Emails, Metallurgical 
data transfer and many more. All these applications need classification of their data as 
top secrete, secrete, confidential and unclassified in order to enforce security and 
hiding of data from intruders. However our scenario will focus on telemedicine 
application in rural area networks. This is applicable to other rural area scenarios as 
well. Figure 2 depicts our scenario and will be used as a framework for our solution: 
• A local doctor wants to transmit a patient (e.g. a village elder) medical data 
to a senior doctor in a main hospital in Europe for evaluation of the patient’s 
condition. There is no communications connectivity in this rural village. So 
public buses can be used as part of the communications transport chain. 
• The medical data is stored on the bus and then transferred to the rural area 
gateway (DTN gateway-1). The data will be stored until the availability of a 
transmission link (e.g. satellite or wireless) to the Internet. 
• The bundle is passed through Internet routers to the Internet Service Provider 
(ISP) gateway and delivered to the hospital network gateway (DTN 
Gateway-2).  The medical data is then transferred to the hospital local server, 
where the senior doctor can examine it. 
• We assumed that segmentation of patient data (sometime called bundle in 
DTN) is done according to the technology used e.g. satellite link or Internet 
is done by DTN gateway-1. 
 Figure 2 Telemedicine application in rural area network 
The above scenario shows a strong need for medical data security and patient identity 
privacy (anonymity). However achieving security and anonymity in such challenging 
network is a difficult task. Passive threats are major concern due to the broadcast 
nature of satellite, where an intruder can easily monitor the user sensitive data. 
 2   Security requirements for DTN 
 
In any network like DTN or Internet, security can be achieved through cryptographic 
functions by providing confidentiality, integrity and authentication. But due to 
disconnected nature of DTN, traditional cryptography is not an optimal solution. 
Researchers had tried to implement Identity Based Cryptography (IBC) as an 
alternative to traditional security techniques. Currently, the DTN related security 
work is focused within the DTN Research Group (DTNRG) and Internet Research 
Task Force (IRTF) [5]. While designing security architecture for DTN one must 
consider some properties, which are [6]. 
 
2.1 Reduce message exchanges 
 
As DTN is suffered from long trip times, so while designing the architecture serious 
attention is required to minimize the message exchanges between two nodes. 
     
2.2 Minimum contact with Trusted Authority 
 
DTN is opportunistic network, so there is no permanent connectivity among the nodes 
so one should take into account that minimum interaction should be done with trusted 
authority, which, in case of public key cryptography is Central Authority (CA) which 
issues certificates and Public Key Generator (PKG) in IBC. 
Current security protocols do not perform well in high delay/disruption conditions, 
because of underlying assumption on which they are built, such as end-to-end 
connectivity is always present; low link delays between communicating parties and 
low error rate on link channels. Thus, new security architecture is needed to meet 
DTN requirements [7], [8]. The current security architecture supports hop-by-hop and 
end-to-end authentication and integrity validation, to ensure data is corrected before 
forwarding. The hop-by hop authentication/integrity is achieved using Bundle 
Authentication Block (BAB).  The BAB is used to assure the authenticity and 
integrity of the bundle along a single hop from forwarder to intermediate receiver. 
Similarly for end-to-end security services, the Payload Integrity Block (PIB) and 
Payload Confidentiality Block (PCB) are used. Further details on security architecture 
in DTN can be found in [8].   
 
However, the current work in DTNRG does not address user anonymity and identity 
hiding. Therefore, in this paper we focus on user anonymity and provide some 
mechanism of message exchange which hides identity of the sender and receiver. 
   
        
 
3    Public and Identity Based Cryptography 
 
Cryptography can be divided into symmetric key cryptography (same key used for 
encryption and decryption) and asymmetric key cryptography (different keys are used 
for encryption and decryption). Public key cryptography is mostly attributed to Diffie, 
Hellman, Rivest, Shamir and Adleman [10]. To use traditional cryptography Public 
Key Infrastructure (PKI) provides a framework which provides foundation for other 
security services. It is used in many application e.g. e-voting, banking, e-commerce 
and many more. PKI supports security building blocks such as; confidentiality, 
authentication, integrity and non-repudiation. The primary goal of PKI is to allow the 
distribution of public keys and certificates and also binding them in a secure manner 
[10]. In case of challenged networks (such as DTN), PKI works well in authentication 
and integrity aspects, but to achieve confidentiality sender requires the receiver public 
key to encrypt data and also checking of Certificate Revocation List (CRL) for 
compromised keys [11]. Such that, these functions require connection availability to 
the Certificate Authority (CA), which is not always possible as shown in our scenario 
(Figure 2). 
To overcome the shortcomings of public key cryptography Adi Shamir proposed the 
topic of Identity Based Cryptography (IBC) in 1984 [12]. In this new cryptographic 
approach user identifier information such as email address, phone number, IP address 
are used instead of certificates as a public key for encryption and verification of 
digital signature [13], [14]. In PKI, the authority which manages certificates was CA. 
In IBC, Public Key Generator (PKG) is the central authority which generates private 
key for participants. IBC can work with exiting public key cryptographic systems e.g. 
RSA, DSS. The PKG is shown in Figure 2 and it is assumed to be co-located with the 
ISP gateway. 
 
IBC works on the following basic algorithms: 
• System setup: - PKG generates its own private key Spkg from security 
parameters pp (where pp is system wide parameters.). 
• Encryption: - sender encrypts the message with the receiver public key 
Preceiver, generated from ID of receiver. 
• Key extraction: - PKG generates private key Sreceiver for receiver from his 
ID, security parameter pp and its own Spkg as input. 
• Decryption: - receiver applies its private key and can decrypt message. 
Adi Shamir only implemented digital signature in his early work and later on Boneh 
and Franklin [15] implemented encryption as well. 
 
There is no guarantee of permanent connectivity in DTN. This can cause a problem in 
the PKI framework, where the sender needs the receiver certificate and public key 
when it wants to send data.  IBC can solve some of the DTN security issues. IBC has 
no significant advantage in authentication and integrity but it works well in 
confidentiality [16].  To achieve integrity and authentication in IBC Seth et al [16] 
suggested the avoiding of Certificate Revocation List (CRL) and proposed  periodic 
refreshing of underlying identifier information e.g. alice@hotmail.com 12-10-2009 is 
Alice key whose validity is till 12th October and the receiver can verify to look into 
the date. 
 
However this was challenged by S.Farrell [17] and argued that verifying Certificate 
from CA is similar to checking public parameter in IBC in DTN. But actually that 
parameter is long lived and no need to checked frequently.  
 
 
4   Pseudonyms and Anonymity 
 
User anonymity (identity hiding) is an important concept in many applications and 
services such as our DTN scenario described in Figure 2. One way of providing 
anonymity is by using Pseudonyms. Pseudonym means falsely named (name other 
then the real name) and can used as an identifier of entity/node. It is created by the 
entity/node itself. There are three kind of pseudonym with respect to unlinkability 
[18]. 
 
• Public pseudonyms 
                Linking between the subject and pseudonym are known publicly from    
                beginning. e.g. name with phone number kept in public directory. 
• Initially non public pseudonyms  
                This type limits its identity to certain parties. e.g. name with account    
                 number known by bank only. 
• Initially unlinked pseudonyms  
               This provides high level of privacy and the pseudonym is known to the     
                entity itself only.   
• Pseudonyms as public Key 
                A digital pseudonym is a public key used to verify signature made by the    
                anonymous subject of the corresponding private key [19]. This approach       
                was also used in mobile ad hoc network (MANETS).  
 
Encryption hides the data transmission from attackers. However sender and receiver 
identity, network address, packet length and packet timing (RTT) can provide useful 
information to adversaries to achieve traffic analysis attacks. So this gives rise to the 
idea of identity hiding and anonymity. The research on anonymity is dated back to 
work done by Chaum’s [19]. The term anonymity according to [20] “Is state of being 
not identifiable within a set of subjects”. Types of anonymity can be defined as: 
 
 
 
Sender anonymity: - To hide the originator of the message. 
Receiver Anonymity: - That the adversary can’t determine the intended receiver if 
the message. 
Unlinkability: - To hide the association of sender and receiver. 
 
Anonymity is required in many applications e.g. e-voting, digital cash, electronic 
email, news reporting, telemedicine and many more. To achieve anonymity 
researchers define anonymous protocols that focus on initiator/sender and 
receiver/recipient anonymity plus their unlinkability (who is with whom). 
Anonymous protocol should prevent message coding attack, timing attack, message 
volume attack, flooding attack, intersection attack and collusion attack [20]. 
Anonymity is achieved though using some anonymous Communication Protocol 
(ACP). Generally most of the ACP are based on idea of Mix Networks by David 
Chaum’s and onion routing [20], [21]. Table 1 shows different ACPs in term of some 
performance metrics.  
 
 
Protocol Sender 
Anonymity 
Receiver 
Anonymity 
Unlinkability Discipline Latency 
TOR Yes Yes Yes Internet Low 
Tarzan Yes No No Peer-to-Peer Low 
Crowds Yes No Yes Web surfing Large 
Cypherpunk 
(Remailer-1) 
No Yes Yes Email Large 
Mixmaster 
(Remailer-2) 
Yes  No Yes Email Large 
Mixminion 
(Remailer-3) 
Yes Yes Yes Email Low 
Table 1 A survey of Anonymous Communication Protocol (ACP) 
All discussed protocols above either use the idea of onion routing or mix networks, 
and provides anonymity at some level. However, the above traditional solution for 
anonymity does not work in DTN because of the disconnected nature and routing 
strategy of DTN. With opportunistic and variable delays source routing is not always 
possible [22]. In DTN, there is no complete routing topology so Onion Routing (OR) 
does not work because OR needs to know the route in advance and encrypt the 
message accordingly for each router on the path. Mix networks can be applied on 
DTN as they hold message for random amount of time and flushes when all packets 
arrived. To overcome these limitations, this paper provides DTN anonymity 
architecture with pseudonym based approach. 
 
5   DTN Anonymity Protocol Design 
 
The protocol is based on IBC and Pseudonyms, where encryption, decryption, digital 
signature and keys are generated using IBC. The identities of users were hided 
through the use of pseudonyms.  
 
Each entity uses its email address as ID (for example) and generates a public key. The 
PKG generates private keys for each participating entity using its own secrete key and 
security parameters pp.  
 
Considering our scenario (Figure-2), the DTN user (local doctor/patient) from rural 
area network wants to send medical data to a senior doctor in a major city hospital.  
However, we want to keep the sender and receiver identity hidden from intruders. 
 
5.1 Assumptions: 
1.  Sender and receiver know each other identities but unknown to other entities 
2.  The PKG requires only once the identity of user to generate the private key. After     
that it stored the identity in the database and update with the date and time. 
3.  Once the entity got the key pairs, they do not need to interact with PKG anymore  
and can send data to other entity. 
4. There is shared secret key between PKG and the destination which in our case is 
senior doctor, through which it can encrypt the bundles exchanges between them. 
5.  The keys are distributed securely through mechanisms such as Secure    
Socket Layer (SSL) to each entity. This key distribution is out of scope for this     
paper. 
6.  Our DTN gateways are trusted. In our proposed solution, anonymity is achieved    
through use of pseudonyms which allow DTN routers/gateways to know that the  
Pseudonym is belonging to the valid authenticated user without unveil his identity 
7.  There is security association between each entity and their corresponding gateway, 
the pseudonym generated by each entity is securely sent to gateway, where it stored in 
the persistence memory. 
8. Both gateways shared a secrete key which is used is to encrypt/decrypt bundles 
between them. 
9.   There is secure channel between both gateways where they exchange both the       
pseudonyms handed by the end entities, so that gateway-1 send the pseudonyms     
of the receiver node to the sender node and gateway-2 send the pseudonym of the     
sender node to the receiving node. In this way now both the end entities have each     
other pseudonym and they can generate the symmetric key and can send data 
securely. 
 
 
We will show the message exchanges between local doctor and DTN gateway-1, 
DTN gateway-1 and DTN gateway-2, and finally will show the operation of intended 
receiver which senior doctor in our case. 
 
 
1. DTN node (local doctor/patient) and Gateway-1 
 
The local doctor will send the patient record to DTN gateway-1 (via the public 
bus). The local doctor  generates random number and then will generate its public 
key (e.g. its email ID). Also generates pseudonyms by hashing the ID 
concatenated with random number. We are assuming that the sender knows the 
email ID of receiver. Local doctor node also generates one time symmetric key 
by concatenating a random number with the pseudonym of receiver. In case of 
simple encryption and without contacting the PKG, the bundle sender can 
generate the key and send bundle to receiver, which is the main advantage of IBC 
over PKI. The local doctor sends the bundle to gateway-1 as next hope address. 
Figure-3a shows operation of local doctor and the exchange of messages between 
local doctor and Gateway-1. 
 
 
                   Figure- 3a messages exchange between DTN node and gateway-1 
 
 
The formats of the source budle and the cryptographic suits applied by the local 
doctor are shown in Figure- 3b and Figure-3c respectively, where Pld is the 
pseudonym generated by the local doctor and Psd is the pseudonym generated by the 
senior doctor. 
       
Security Source (Pld) 
 Security Destination (Psd) 
Cryptographic functions 
Data 
Figure -3b inner bundle 
Generation of random number r 
Public key= IDld 
Pseudonym of local doctor 
node=Pld=H(r.IDld) 
Symmetric key between sender 
node and receiver node 
Ks=(r.Pld). 
 
 
 
Figure- 3c Cryptographic functions 
 
Here the local doctor node put his pseudonym as Pld, and the receiver as Psd. As he 
received the pseudonym of receiver from the gateway-1 via secure channel.  
 
 
2. DTN gateway-1 to DTN gateway-2 
 
Whenever DTN gateway-1 receives the bundle it will keep record of pseudonyms 
with their corresponding IDs. It will forward the message to DTN gateway-2. The 
structure of the message is shown in figure-4a. The format of the gateway bundle 
is shown in figure-4b where the inner bundle comes as data part encrypted by 
shared symmetric key between both gateways (as presented in the assumption 
section 5.1). Gateway-2 will pass this bundle to senior doctor as it is by only 
changing the source and destination address to gateway-2 and senior doctor 
address respectively. 
 
 
 
Figure- 4a messages exchange between gateway-1 and gateway-2 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Gateway-1 address 
Gateway-2 address 
Data( inner bundle) 
Figure-4b Gateway bundle 
 
 
3. Operation of receiving node 
 
When the gateway bundle reaches the intended receiver (senior doctor) so it will 
do the same operation as of sender e.g. generating random number, public key 
and pseudonym. The following figure-5a shows the bundle exchanges between 
senior doctor and PKG. Here senior doctor will need private key to decrypt the 
message which was encrypted by its public key. As this network is directly 
connected to Internet so receiver will request for his private key to PKG by 
creating destination bundle shown in figure- 5b, putting its Identity as data and 
encrypted via the symmetric key between PKG and senior doctor (as presented in 
the assumption section 5.1). In our scenario the trusted authority residing at ISP 
server which generates private key for receiver using it security parameters pp 
and ID of receiver. It will securely send the generated private key by creating 
PKG bundle shown in figure-5c encrypted via symmetric key. Now the senior 
doctor will first decrypt the PKG bundle and will get the private key and by using 
that private key senior doctor will first decrypt the message by its own private 
key and will obtain the symmetric key and will verify MAC through symmetric 
key.  
 
 
 
 
Figure -5a Operations of the intended receiver 
 
Source address(senior doctor) 
Destination address(PKG) 
Data (email ID) 
                                        Figure-5b Destination bundle 
 
 
Source address 
Destination address 
Private key 
Figure- 5c PKG Bundle             
 
The receiving node already calculated the symmetric key, pseudonym prior to the 
receiving of bundle, upon the receiving it just send the request for private key to the 
PKG, which generate key for receiving node and send via secure channel. 
 
While on the way back when the senior doctor want to transmit the report to the local 
doctor, so it will fallow the same path  i.e. senior doctor will generate a bundle as 
inner bundle same as described earlier and will send to the gateway-2. The gateway-2 
will generate the gateway bundle and transmit it to gateway1 where the inner bundle 
will come as the data part encrypted using the shared secret key between pair of 
gateways.  Then the gateway-1 will send the bundle to the local doctor and here we 
assumed that the local doctor has already got the its own private key and can 
performed all cryptographic functions. 
  
 
In this pseudonym and identity based anonymous system we clearly show the 
anonymity of sender and receiver. Here the adversary can correlate two pseudonyms 
with each other but can not identify the real identities of those pseudonyms. A user 
can change its pseudonym frequently. As a bundle stored at gateway-1 for the 
connection to be up so that adversary unable to calculate the RTT and hence can not 
launch traffic analysis attacks. Adversary knows only the messages exchange between 
gateways which will not be useful with identifying the real sender/receiver. We used 
traditional public cryptography for authentication and integrity and for end to end 
confidentiality we successful used IBC. We used date concept described earlier with 
private key for validity reasons. As there is only one PKG so if the key of PKG 
compromise then adversary can easily generates keys for participants and can encrypt 
or decrypt data. 
 
 
6   Conclusions and Future Work 
 
The DTN concept is suitable for challenged networks such as deep space mission, 
disaster monitoring and rural area networks. In this paper, we focused on a 
telemedicine application in rural areas with the objective of exchanging confidential 
medical data securely with a hospital in a remote city. We provide patient anonymity 
and identity hiding. An overview of DTN, Identity Based Cryptography and 
pseudonyms is presented. Also an analysis of anonymous routing protocols has shown 
that they are not suitable for DTN environment. 
 
The paper presented our DTN anonymity protocol design and the message exchanges 
between the users and DTN gateways.  The analysis showed that using pseudonym 
provides a convenient mechanism for user anonymity and medical data encryption. In 
our future work, we will implement this system using Pairing Based Cryptography 
(PBC), where some earlier work was published by Stanford University [23]. We will 
implement our design in a testbed using DTN-2 reference model [24]. We also note 
that PKG is single point of contact in our design so our future work will be extended 
to use hierarchical PKG and IBC. 
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